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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider the United States Constitution. The Constitution
is open-ended, generalized and telescopic in character. What
has it spawned? Pervasive ambiguity and unending litigation.
Contrast the extreme counter-model of law, the Internal
Revenue Code and its festooned vines of regulations. Code
and regulations are particularized, elaborated and microscopic

in character. What have they spawned? Pervasive ambiguity
and unending litigation.

-Bayless Manning 1

Congressional hearings held in September 1997 and April-May 1998
detailed personal accounts of gross abuse suffered by taxpayers at the
hands of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).2 Lawmakers sought to
capitalize on the resulting public anger and outcry by passing legislation
overhauling the IRS. 3 These efforts reached their climax on July 22, 1998
when President Clinton signed into law the Internal Revenue Service

1. Jeffery L. Yablon,As CertainAsDeath-QuotationsAboutTaxes, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY
249-30 (1997).
2. See David Hosansky, LatestIRSHearingsPrompt CallsForLessBashing,MoreAction,
CONG. Q. WKLY., May 2, 1998, at 1145 ("The high-profile hearings, held April 28 through May 1,
uncovered numerous alleged abuses at the embattled agency. IRS whistleblowers, aggrieved
business owners[,] and former Senate Majority Leader Howard H. BakerJr. painted a picture of an
agency dangerously out of control, where managers commit fraud without fear of punishment and
heavily armed agents break down the doors of innocent taxpayers."); Jonathan Weisman, Congress
and Country Fired Up After Hearingson IRS Abuses, CONG. Q. WKLY., Oct. 4, 1997, at 2379
('Three days of Senate Finance Committee hearings Sept. 23-25 have touched a nerve, sparking
a firestorm of protest against an agency that Americans love to hate.").
3. See Weisman, supra note 2. Organizers of the Congressional IRS hearings readily admit
that they were laying the foundation for future IRS reform and tax legislation. See id. at 2380.
Indeed, influential Republican pollster Frank Luntz advised House Republicans that the time is ripe
to move on tax and IRS reform issues, and that these issues could "carry [Republicans] all the way
to the 2000 elections." Id. at 2379-80. See also Hosansky, supranote 2, at 1145-46 ("Republicans
make no secret about seeing the issue of IRS reform as a major political winner. Thrown on the
defensive, President Clinton and many Democrats, who once resisted revamping the agency, are
now raising few objections to GOP proposals.").
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Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 4 (RS Reform Act of 1998). 5
One part of the IRS Reform Act of 1998 creates a limited tax
practitioner-client privilege similar to the common law attorney-client
privilege.6 This Note will explore how the tax practitioner-client privilege
will impact taxpayers, attorneys, and non-attorney tax practitioners such as
accountants. Part II discusses the common law regarding a tax practitionerclient privilege before the enactment of the IRS Act of 1998. Part In
defines the scope of tax practitioner-client privilege. Part IV explores the
benefits of the tax practitioner-client privilege. Part V considers the
problems created by the tax practitioner-client privilege. Finally, Part VI
weighs the benefits and problems and determine the overall value of
having the tax practitioner-client privilege.
HI. COMMON LAw
The attorney-client privilege has been accepted since the reign of
Elizabeth I' This privilege has long been a bedrock of the American legal
systemn. The issue of attorney-client privilege is the most common
discovery dispute and is one of the most frequent issues arising in civil
litigation.9 The result of the attorney-client privilege is that an attorney
cannot be compelled to disclose and must not voluntarily disclose matters
conveyed to the attorney in confidence by a client for purposes of obtaining
legal advice." To provide a context for analysis of the tax practitionerclient privilege, the following Subparts discuss issues relating to the
attorney-client privilege that are relevant to the tax practitioner-client
privilege.

4. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
112 Stat. 685.
5. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Clinton'sSignatureHeraldsa New IRS, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY
141-1 (1998).
6. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3411.
7. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
8. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888) (rhe privilege was "founded upon the
necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of
the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when
free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.'); 8 WIGMORE, supranote 7, § 2290,
at 542-45.
9. See EDNA SELANEPSTEIN, THEATrORNEY-CUENTPRIVILEGEANDTHEWORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 1 (3d ed. 1997).
10. See id.at3.
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A. The Definition of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The United States Supreme Court explained the importance of the
attorney-client privilege in Upjohn Co. v. UnitedStates:'
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law. Its
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interest in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy... depends upon the lawyer's [sic]
being fully informed by the client. 2
Wigmore set forth eight elements as the predicate for successfully
asserting the attorney-client privilege:
(1) [wlhere legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 3
Wigmore's definition collapses into four elements which are required to
establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) [a] communication;
(2) made between privileged persons;
(3) in confidence;
(4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing legal
assistance to the client. 4
All four of the elements must be affirmatively established by the party
asserting the privilege for an attorney-client privilege to exist. 5 If one of
11. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
12. Id. at 389 (citations omitted); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,51 (1980)
("The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that
relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried
out."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (recognizing that the purpose of the
privilege is "to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys").
13. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554.
14. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 35 (quoting RESTATEmENT, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 118 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1988)).
15. See EPSTEIN, supranote 9, at 29,35; see also United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328,334
(7th Cir. 1992) ("A blanket claim of privilege that does not specify what information is protected
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the elements is missing, testimony can be compelled. 6
B. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
Even when a communication has been made between privileged
persons, in confidence, and for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or
providing legal advice, the attorney-client privilege can be destroyed by
waiver.17 Thus, the attorney-client privilege will not be recognized if it has
been previously waived."s

A waiver of the attorney-client privilege can occur inadvertently or

unintentionally.19 The privilege can be waived even when the client neither
understands nor intends the waiver to be the effect of his or her actions.2z
Once the attorney-client privilege has been waived, the privilege is
generally deemed to be surrendered for all purposes and in all
circumstances thereafter.2" Accordingly, when the privilege is waived and
the confidential information is disclosed to one party, then it is deemed to
also have been waived to all other parties.'
C. Tax Law and the Attorney-ClientPrivilege

The continuum of functions performed by tax practitioners has tax
return preparation on one extreme and tax litigation on the other.23 Case
will not suffice."); United States v. First State Bank, 691 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A
taxpayer need not reveal so many facts that the privilege becomes worthless[,] but he must at least
identify the general nature of that document, the specific privilege he is claiming for that document,
and facts which establish all the elements of the privilege he is claiming.").
16. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 35.
17. See id.
at 158. See generallyRichard L. Marcus, The Perilsof Privilege:Waiverand the
Litigator,84 MICH. L. REV. 1605 (1986).
18. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 158.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 158-59; 8 WIGMORE, supranote 7, § 2327, at 636 ("A privileged person would
seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There
is always also the objective consideration that when his conduct touches a certain point of
disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not.").
21. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 220.
22. See id.; Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a laudable activity, but it is hard
to understand how such conduct improves the attorney-client relationship. If the client feels the
need to keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free to do so under the
traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege, even when the discovery request comes from
a 'friendly' agency... The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents,
waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or
to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised
for his own benefit.").
23. See Lee A. Sheppard,NewsAnalysis:What TaxAdvice Privilege?,98 TANOTESTODAY
128-33 (1998).
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law has held for years that tax return preparation is not privileged

information.24 Tax litigation, like other types of litigation, is protected by
the attorney-client privilege as well as the work product doctrine.' In the
middle of the continuum is a murky swamp called tax planning.26 Lawyers
seem to believe that tax planning is protected by the attorney-client
privilege and accountants wish to have tax planning covered by the new

tax practitioner-client privilege.27 In the tax planning arena, there are tax
shelter opinions which accountants also hope to have protected by the tax

practitioner-client privilege.2'
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co., the IRS sought tax accrual

24. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223,1225 (1 Ith Cir. 1987) ("[I]nformation
... transmitted... for the purpose of preparing.. . tax returns ... is not privileged information.");
United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297,298-99 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that tax return preparation
is not the rendering of legal advice); Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 n.7 (8th Cir.
1966). However, some courts have held that tax return preparation involves some legal advice, but
the privilege was vitiated because there was either no expectation of confidentiality or there had
been a waiver of the privilege. See United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that information transmitted for use on a tax return has no expectation of confidentiality);
Dorokee Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 277,279-80 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Even those courts holding
that the attorney-client privilege can arise from the preparation of income tax returns do not apply
the privilege to documents given by a client to an attorney for inclusion in the client's income tax
return, because such information is obviously not intended to remain confidential."); United States
v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding privilege waived not only as to the
information on the tax return but also as to the details underlying the information because
taxpayer's accountant transcribed the information from workpapers onto amended tax returns).
25. See Sheppard, supra note 23; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,398-99 (1981)
(holding that IRS summons enforcement proceedings are governed by the federal rules of evidence
and that the documents sought by the IRS were protected by the work-product doctrine). The
seminal case, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947), established the work-product
doctrine which is now codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 292.
Rule 26(b)(3)... provides a qualifiedprotection from discovery in a civil action
when materials are
(1) Documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable;
(2) Prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and
(3) Prepared by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative.
To overcome the qualified protection, the party seeking discovery must make
a showing of
(1) Substantial need for the materials, and
(2) Inability to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information without
undue hardship.
EPSTEIN,
26.
27.
28.

supra note 9, at 293 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
See Sheppard, supra note 23.
See id.
See id. See infraPart llI.E. for further discussion of tax shelters and tax shelter opinions.
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workpapers from the taxpayer's independent accounting firm.29 The
taxpayer argued for the creation of a work-product immunity for
accountants' tax accrual workpapers.30 The Supreme Court of the United
States held that there is no privilege of confidentiality between accountants
(or other non-attorney tax practitioners) and their clients in matters of
federal tax controversies. 31
IH. DEFINING THE TAX PRACTrONER-CLENT PRIVMEGE
Section 3411 of the IRS Reform Act of 1998 creates the tax
practitioner-client privilege by adding §7525 to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 ("Internal Revenue Code"). 32 Section 7525 provides in relevant
part:
(a) Uniform application to taxpayer communications with
federally authorized practitioners(1) General rule-With respect to tax advice, the same
common law protections of confidentiality which apply
to a communication between a taxpayer and an
attorney shall also apply to a communication between
a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner
to the extent the communication would be considered
a privileged communication if it were between a
taxpayer and an attorney.
(2) Limitations-Paragraph (1) may only be asserted in(A) any noncriminal tax matter before the Internal
Revenue Service; and
(B) any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court
brought by or against the United States.
(3) Definitions-For purposes of this subsection(A) Federally authorized tax practitioner-The term

29. See 465 U.S. 805,808-09 (1984). Working papers "are records kept by the auditor of the
procedures applied, the tests performed, the information obtained, and the pertinent conclusions
reached in the engagement." AICPA Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU § 339.03 (1998). InArthur
Young &Co., the independent auditor for the taxpayer was responsible for auditing the taxpayers's
financial statements. See 465 U.S. at 808. In performing this function, Arthur Young &Co. verified
the taxpayer's contingent tax liabilities and, in doing so, prepared tax accrual workpapers relating
to the evaluation of the taxpayer's reserves for such liabilities. See id. at 808-09.
30. See Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 815.

31. See id. at 817; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that
"no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law").
32. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and ReformAct of 1998 § 3411, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified at I.R.C. § 7525 (West 1998)).
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"federally authorized tax practitioner" means
any individual who is authorized under Federal
law to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service if such practice is subject to Federal
regulation under section 330 of title 31, United
States Code.
Tax advice-The term "tax advice" means
advice given by an individual with respect to a
matter which is within the scope of the
individual's authority to practice described in
subparagraph (A).

(b) Section not to apply to communications regarding
corporate tax shelters-The privilege under subsection (a)
shall not apply to any written communication between a
federally authorized tax practitioner and a director,
shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or representative
of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the
direct or indirect participation of such corporation in33any
tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)).
The following Subparts analyze section 7525. Subpart A explores the
meaning of tax advice. Subpart B discusses how the tax practitioner-client
privilege is an extension of the attorney-client privilege. Subpart C
explains who is a federally authorized tax practitioner. Subpart D details
the proceedings where the tax practitioner-client privilege can be asserted.
Subpart E gives guidance on the tax practitioner-client privilege tax shelter
exception. Subpart F considers waiver of the tax practitioner-client
privilege.
A. What is Tax Advice?
Section 7525(a)(1) provides that the tax practitioner-client privilege
only applies "[w]ith respect to tax advice., 34 Tax advice is defined in
section 7525(a)(3)(B) as "advice given by an individual with respect to a
matter which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice
described in [section 7525(a)(3)(A)]. 35 Section 7525(a)(3)(A) defines a
federally authorized tax practitioner as "any individual who is authorized
under Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue Service." 36 The
Senate Report on the IRS Reform Act of 1998 clarifies that tax advice is
"advice that is within the scope of authority for such individual's practice
33.
34.
35.
36.

I.R.C. § 7525 (West 1998).
Id. § 7525(a)(1).
Id. § 7525(a)(3)(B).
Id. § 7525(a)(3)(A).
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with respect to matters under Title 26" of the United States Code, which
contains the Internal Revenue Code.37
Section 7525 further limits the tax practitioner-client privilege to only
"noncriminal tax matter[s] before the Internal Revenue Service; and...
noncriminal tax proceeding[s] in Federal court brought by or against the
United States. 38 Merely writing tax memorandums or giving tax advice
may, therefore, not constitute representation before the IRS. Consequently,
the tax practitioner-client privilege would not apply to writing tax
memorandums or giving tax advice,39 assuming that they do not relate to
a "noncriminal tax proceeding in Fedeial court brought by or against the
United States.' ' " "[I]t is the [tax] memorandums and opinions created in
the ordinary course of giving tax advice.., that the accountants wanted to
protect with their new [tax practitioner-client] privilege., 41 However, it is
unclear if the tax practitioner-client privilege will reach out to protect those
tax memorandums and opinions, and if accountants will ultimately get
their wish.42
B. The Relationship Between the Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Tax Practitioner-ClientPrivilege
Section 7525 does not modify the attorney-client privilege, other than
to extend it from attorneys to all authorized tax practitioners.43 Thus,
except for criminal proceedings, the tax practitioner-client privilege
established by § 7525 is subject to the same limitations as the attorneyclient privilege.' Consequently, the tax practitioner-client privilege applies
only to the extent that such communications would be privileged if they
were between a client-taxpayer and an attorney.4 5
C. Who is a FederallyAuthorized Tax Practitioner?
Section 7525(a)(1) states that the tax practitioner-client privilege only
extends to a "federally authorized tax practitioner." 6 Section
7525(a)(3)(A) explains that a federally authorized tax practitioner is "any
individual who is authorized under Federal law to practice before the
Internal Revenue Service if such practice is subject to Federal regulation
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998).
I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2)(A), (B).
See Sheppard, supra note 23.
I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2)(B).
Sheppard, supra note 23.
See Sheppard, supra note 23.
See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998).
See id. at 70-71.
See id. at 70.
I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1).
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under section 330 of title 31, United States Code."4'
Through section 330 of title 31, the Treasury Department regulates
persons who practice before the Treasury Department and ultimately the
IRS." Accordingly, the tax practitioner-client privilege is extended to
attorneys, certified public accountants (CPAs), enrolled agents49 and

enrolled actuaries.50

47. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(A).
48. See 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1994). Section 330 of title 31 provides that:
(a) Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury may(1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department
of the Treasury; and
(2) before admitting a representative to practice, require that the
representative demonstrate(A) good character,
(B) good reputation;
(C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative to provide to
persons valuable service; and
(D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their cases.
(b) After notice and opportunity for a proceeding, the Secretary may suspend or
disbar from practic before the Department a representative who(1) is incompetent;
(2) is disreputable;
(3) violates regulations prescribed under this section; or
(4) with intent to defraud, willfully and knowingly misleads or threatens the
person being represented or a prospective person to be represented.
(c) After notice and opportunity for a hearing to any appraiser with respect to
whom a penalty has been assessed under section 6701(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the Secretary may(1) provide that appraisals by such appraiser shall not have any probative
effect in any administrative proceeding before the Department of the
Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service, and
(2) bar such appraiser from presenting evidence or testimony in any such
proceeding.
See generallyJohn C. Gardner & Susan L. Wiley, The Tax Practitioner'sGuide to Circular230,
26 TAx ADVISOR 647, 711 (Nov.-Dec. 1995) (discussing practice solicitation, fee issues, due
diligence under the § 6694 realistic possibility standard, and disreputable conduct under Treasury
Department Circular 230).
49. Enrolled agents are individuals, other than attorneys or CPAs, authorized to represent
clients and practice before the IRS. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(c) (1998); I.R.S. News Release IR-86-65
(May 8, 1986).
50. SeeS.REP.NO. 105-174, at70 (1998). Enrolled actuaries areindividuals who areenrolled
as actuaries by the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1242, and
are authorized to represent clients before the IRS. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(d) (1998).
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D. ProceedingsWhere the Tax Practitioner-Client
PrivilegeCan Be Asserted
Both civil and criminal penalties are imposed on taxpayers to enforce
the tax laws.51 However, the tax practitioner-client privilege "may only be
asserted in noncriminal tax proceedings before the IRS and in the Federal
Courts with regard to such noncriminal tax matters in proceedings where
the IRS is
a party."52 Noncriminal tax proceedings are by default civil tax
53
matters.
Civil tax matters are investigated by IRS revenue agents through
audits.54 Civil tax matters may result in the IRS assessing penalties for such
violations as failure to file a tax return under I.R.C. § 665 1(a)(1), failure
to pay tax under LR.C. § 6651(a)(2), or accuracy related penalties under
I.R.C. § 6662(a) and (b).55 Criminal tax matters must be referred to a
special agent5 6 from an audit,57 government agency, financial institution,
or from some other source. 8 Criminal tax matters may result in the IRS
assessing penalties for such violations as willful attempt to evade or defeat
tax under LR.C. § 7201, willful failure to file a tax return under LR.C. §
7203, or willful failure to pay tax under LR.C. § 7203. 59
Furthermore, the privilege may not be asserted to block the disclosure
of information to any regulatory body other than the IRS.' Thus, the ability
of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to obtain or compel
confidential information from a tax-practitioner is unchanged by §7525.61

51. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943). Civil penalties consist of fines

levied in addition to the tax due. See id.Criminal penalties "consist of penal offenses enforced by
the criminal process." Id.
52. S.REP. No. 105-174, at 71; see I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2).
53. See HARROPA. FREEMAN&NORMAND.FREEMAN,THETAXPRACTicEDESKBOOK

10-1

(1973).
54. See Pamela H. Bucy, CriminalTax Fraud:The Downfall of Murderers,Madams and
Thieves, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J.639, 670 (1997).
55. See FREEMAN&FREEMAN, supra note 53, at 10-I.

56. A special agent is a criminal investigator for the IRS. See Ray A. Knight & Lee G.
Knight, CriminalTax Fraud:An Analytical Review, 57 MO. L. REV. 175,185 (1992).
57. "Once the examining revenue agent [conducting a civil audit] suspects a possible criminal
violation, he prepares a [criminal] fraud referral report which is forwarded to the Intelligence
Division [of the IRS] for evaluation. Upon acceptance of the case by Intelligence, it is assigned to
a special agent. The special agent gives the case preliminary consideration to determine if a
[criminal] fraud investigation is warranted. If so, the case is 'jacketed,' that is, a special
investigation file is set up and the investigation commenced." Id at 186.
58. See id. at 185-86 n.64 (citing I.R.M. § [4231] 910,911 (1987)).
59. See FREEMAN & FREEMAN, supra note 53, at 10-3. See generally KNIGHT & KNIGHT,
supra note 56.
60. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 71 (1998).
61. See id.
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E. The Tax Shelter Exception
Section 7525(b) bars the tax practitioner-client privilege from
protecting "written communication[s] between a federally authorized tax
practitioner and a director, shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or
representative of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the
direct or indirect participation of such corporation in any tax shelter (as
defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii))." '6 2 In lobbying for the privilege,
accountants especially hoped to have the privilege extend to corporate tax
shelter opinions because the opinions can be billed at a premium and
because what constitutes a corporate tax shelter has not been fully
defined. 6
Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) defines a tax shelter as "(I) a partnership or
other entity, (II) any investment plan or arrangement, or (II) any other plan
or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan,
or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." 6 The
Treasury Regulations interpreting the tax shelter definition have not been
updated since the words "a significant purpose" replaced the words "the
principal purpose" in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.65
Section 7525(b) provides that the tax practitioner-client privilege does
not apply to written communications with corporate representatives "in
connection with thepromotion ofthe direct or indirect participation of such
corporation in any tax shelter."' However, the words "promotion of" may
not narrow the scope of the broad phrase "in connection with." 67 Case law
has interpreted the idea of tax shelter promotion liberally to include
assistance in getting the investor into the shelter.6' The Treasury
Department has already been under pressure for close to a year to define
exactly what a tax shelter is for purposes of registration requirements.69
Nevertheless, it seems reasonably foreseeable that the IRS will have a
liberal interpretation of what constitutes a tax shelter under § 7525(b), so
62. I.R.C. § 7525(b) (emphasis added).
63. See Sheppard, supra note 23.
64. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).

65. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(i), (g)(3) (as amended in 1995); see Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
66. I.R.C. § 7525(b) (emphasis added); see Sheppard, supra note 23.
67. See Sheppard, supra note 23.
68. See id.; see also Nielsen v. United States, 976 F.2d 951,956 (5th Cir. 1992); Kuchan v.
United States, 679 F. Supp. 764,768 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
69. See Sheryl Stratton, Tax Shelters: Congress'sApproach Puts Treasury Under the Gun,

98 TAx NOTES TODAY 149-9 (1998). The registration requirements contained in § 6111(d), were
added by Congress in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. See id.
"It expands existing registration rules to cover certain confidential corporate tax shelters. But
section 6111(d) is not effective until Treasury issues guidance on how it will apply. Many
practitioners have been anxiously awaiting that guidance." Id.
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that they can have access to as much taxpayer information as possible.7 °
The IRS may prevail because in Baldridgev. Shapiro," the Supreme Court
held that "[a] statute granting a privilege is to be strictly construed so as 'to
that would suppress otherwise competent
avoid a construction
72
evidence."
F. Waiver of the Tax Practitioner-ClientPrivilege
The tax practitioner-client privilege, like the attorney-client privilege,
can be waived.73 Therefore, a waiver of the tax practitioner-privilege, like
the attorney-client privilege, can occur without knowing or intending to
waive the privilege.7' Also, once the tax practitioner-client privilege is
waived, the privilege is generally deemed to be surrendered for all
purposes and in all circumstances thereafter.75
Disclosure of privileged information to another federal agency
constitutes a waiver. 76 Also, the tax practitioner-client privilege can be
waived by providing privileged information to someone providing nonlegal services to the client.' This problem can be particularly problematic
when attorneys disclose privileged information to accountants who are also
assisting the client.7"
Therefore, § 7525 extends the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality to tax advice rendered by a federally authorized tax
practitioner to a taxpayer in any noncriminal proceeding before the IRS or
in a Federal court where the IRS is a party.79 However, the tax practitionerclient privilege does not apply to certain communications regarding a
corporations' participation in a tax shelter.80 Furthermore, the tax

70. See Sheppard, supra note 23.
71. 455 U.S. 345 (1982).
72. Id. at 360 (quoting St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208,218 (1961)).
73. See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (applying the principals of the common law attorney-client
privilege to the tax practitioner-client privilege); see also Sheppard, supra note 23.
74. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 158 (stating the analogous principle for the attorney-client
privilege).
75. Cf. id. at 220 (stating the analogous principle for the attorney-client privilege).
76. See Sheppard, supra note 23; cf. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the attorney-client privilege, waived with respect to turning
documents over to one federal agency, could not be reasserted in litigation with another federal
agency).
77. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 174 (stating analogous principle for attorney-client
privilege).
78. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539-41 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding
client's disclosure of information regarding potential tax liability issues with its independent
auditors was a waiver of the attorney-client privilege); cf., e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 174.
79. See supra Part III.A-D.
80. See supra Part III.E.
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practitioner-client privilege may be waived for all purposes if the
confidential information is disclosed to non-parties."1
IV. BENEFTS OF THE TAx PRACmrONER-CLENT PRIVLEGE
For decades accountants have tried to persuade courts and Congress to
create some sort of accountant privilege. There were four primary benefits
used by accountants inlobbying for the enactment of the tax practitionerclient privilege. First, accountants claim that the most important benefit of
the tax practitioner-client privilege is that it will give consumers a wider
array of tax practitioners to choose from by leveling the playing field
between attorneys and non-attorney tax practitioners.82 In the view of some
accountants, non-attorney tax practitioners "should have the same rights
[as attorneys], in terms of protecting a taxpayer's rights, in practice before
the [IRS] and the Tax Court .... A taxpayer has the right not to be
and to have the professional of their choice represent
disadvantaged
83
them."
Second, in testimony before the National Commission on Restructuring
the IRS, accountant Michael E. Mares, Chairman, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Tax Executive Committee, stated:
Taxpayers expect privacy and confidentiality in discussing tax
matters with their advisers. As a matter of public policy, a
taxpayer has the right to expect that if the tax adviser selected
is authorized to practice before the IRS, all information the
adviser has regarding the taxpayer's tax matters will be
accorded the same protection of privacy, regardless of the
specific professional classification of the adviser.4
Third, demand for tax practitioners to represent taxpayers, especially
lower-income taxpayers, far exceeds the supply of tax lawyers, not to
mention the inability of lower-income taxpayers to pay the tax lawyer's
high fees.85 Consequently, the tax practitioner-client privilege is fulfilling

81. See supra Part III.F.
82. See Sheryl Stratton, Accountant-ClientPrivilege ProposalSliced and Diced, 98 TAX
NOTES TODAY 103-1 (1998) (quoting Ken C. Jones, KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Stratton, Sliced and Diced]; see also John Gibeaut, Squeeze, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1998, at
42, 45; Sheryl Stratton, ABA Finally Opposes Accountant Privilege Proposal,98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 75-2 (1998) [hereinafter Stratton, ABA Finally Opposes].
83. Sheryl Stratton, Practiceof Law by CPA Firm Members Raises Legal and Ethical
Questions, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 80-6 (1997) (quoting Mark H. Ely, KPMG Peat Marwick,
Washington, D.C.).
84. Michael E. Mares, AICPA's Comments at IRS CommissionTaxpayerRightsMeeting, 97
TAX NOTES TODAY 39-64 (1997).
85. See Paul R. Rice, Accountant-ClientPrivilege:A MisdirectedDebate, 98 TAX NOTES
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a societal need and, thus, is benefitting all of society. 6
Finally, the long standing rationale for the attorney-client privilege is
that it frees clients to speak candidly with their attorneys.8 7 This candor
enables attorneys to be more effective and efficient in performing their
role.88 The necessity of candor in attorney-client relationships is also
applicable to non-attorney tax practitioner-client relationships.89 Thus,
accountants argue that the tax practitioner-client privilege, like the
attorney-client privilege, is beneficial because of the need for full
disclosure from clients in order to enable tax practitioners to do the most
effective job possible.' °
In summarizing the benefits of a tax practitioner-client privilege in the
context of actual practice, Elizabeth P. Askey, in-house lawyer for General
Electric Co., stated that obtaining premium service and tax advice
"sometimes means there are 'accountants at the table and sometimes it's
just lawyers, sometimes both, [but] [i]n every instance... [taxpayers] are
getting ultimately the same thing-advice on how to apply a specific set
of laws to a specific set of facts."' 9 Askey continued by explaining that the
goal is to obtain, as efficiently as possible, privileged status for
communications with tax practitioners.' Finally, she concluded by stating
that "[g]ranting some sort of privilege to tax advice.., is a good thing."93
V. PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE TAx PRACrITIONERCLIENT PRIVILEGE

While the new tax practitioner-client privilege has some benefits, it is
also riddled with serious substantive and procedural problems that must be
solved before the tax practitioner-client privilege will fulfill the legitimate
expectations of taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the government.' The
following Subparts explore the major problems presented by the tax
practitioner-client privilege. Subpart A discusses the conflicting roles
between independent auditors and zealous advocates. Subpart B explains
how the tax practitioner-client privilege may promote illegal activity.
109-89 (1998).
86. See id.
87. See supra text accompanying note 12.

TODAY

88. See id.
89. See Barton Massey, PractitionersSpell Out What CPA-ClientPrivilege Won't Do, 98
TAX NOTES TODAY 111-6

(1998).

90. See id.; cf. supra text accompanying note 12.

91. Stratton, Sliced andDiced, supra note 82 (quoting Elizabeth P. Askey, in-house lawyer
for General Electric Co.).
92. See id.

93. Id.
94. See Jerome J. Shestack, ABA Opposes Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Nonlawyers, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 73-25 (1998).
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Subpart C details the uncertainty regarding waiver of the tax practitionerclient privilege. Subpart D analyzes the tax practitioner-client privilege
when a civil tax matter becomes a criminal tax matter. Finally, Subpart E
illustrates the limited effect of the tax practitioner-client privilege in
practice.
A. IndependentAuditor vs. Zealous Advocate
In analyzing the effects of the tax practitioner-client privilege, it is
important to examine the critical and different roles that accountants and
attorneys play in our society.95 The primary role of accountants is to be
independent auditors and to objectively certify the financial statements of
business enterprises.6 "Independence must certainly be regarded as the
auditor's most critical characteristic."' Furthermore, "[i]ndependent
auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should avoid
situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence." 98 If an
accountant is an auditor as well as a tax advocate for his or her client, then
there is at least the appearance of a less than completely independent
relationship. 99
The accountant's role is quite distinct from the advocacy role played by
attorneys. 1" Attorneys are to be zealous advocates for their clients."0 "If
the auditor is an advocate for the client.., he or she cannot be considered
independent."' 2 In UnitedStates v. Arthur Young & Co., 0 3 Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for a unanimous court, rejected the creation of an
accountant-client privilege and stated:
[T]he independent auditor assumes a public responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client.
The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's
creditors and stockholders, as well as to [the] investing

95. See, e.g., Stefan F. Tucker, American Bar Association Testimony at Second Day of
FinanceHearingon IRSReform, 98 TAXNOTESTODAY20-24 (1998) (Mr. Tucker was representing
the American Bar Association, Section of Taxation.).
96. See Shestack, supra note 94.
97. ALVINA. ARENS &JAMES K LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: ANINTEGRATED APPROACH 79 (6th

ed. 1994).
98. AICPA Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU § 220.03, at 161 (1998).
99. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, The CPA Tax PracticePrivilege-LessThan
Meets the Eye, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 210-55 (1997).
100. See Shestack, supra note 94.
101. See Stratton, ABA Finally Opposes, supra note 82.
102. ARENS &LOEBBECKE, supranote 97, at 79; see also AICPA Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU § 220.03, at 161 (1998).
103. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all
times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To
insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to
ignore the significance of the accountant's role as a
disinterested analyst charged with public obligations."
Consider, for example, a situation where a small business is seeking
financing and is currently involved in tax litigation.'05 If a non-attorney tax
practitioner, such as an accountant, is given confidential tax information
during the course of tax litigation, the accountant could not exercise the
privilege to prevent disclosure of that information to potential lenders who
require certified financial statements." At the same time, and perhaps
involving the same transaction, the accountant must maintain
confidentiality by asserting privilege, while also disclosing information to
fulfill his or her duty as an independent auditor. 7
Similarly, an accountant cannot assert the tax practitioner-client
privilege to prevent disclosure of a client's potential tax controversies
because of Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") Statement
No. 5.'1o FASB Statement No. 5 requires accountants to disclose in the
footnotes of financial statements loss contingencies, such as potential tax
controversies, when "there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss...
may have been incurred.""' 9 Accordingly, there is a conflict between an
accountant's function as independent auditor to apply FASB Statement No.
5 to disclose potential tax controversies in the footnotes of financial
statements, and the accountant's function as tax advocate to maintain the
confidentiality of information regarding the tax controversy." 0
In addition, accountants can foresee a problem where the same
accounting firm both certifies the financial statements and, also, provides
tax advice to a publicly traded client."' The tax partner will have a bit of
a problem telling the audit partner, "I'd really like to certify these

104. Id. at 817-18; see also AICPA Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU § 220.02, at 161
(1998).
105. See Tucker, supra note 95.
106. See id.
107. See Raby & Raby, supra note 99.
108. See id.
109. ACcOUNTING STANDARDS, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, 10
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998). The rationale for requiring disclosure of loss
contingencies, including potential tax controversies, is to prevent misleading financial statements.
See id. 9 9.
110. See Raby & Raby, supra note 99.
111. See Stratton, Sliced and Diced, supra note 82.
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records[,] but there are confidential things that I can't talk to you about."1 12
Moreover, accounting firms may find that they will have to disqualify
themselves in such situations. "' Alternatively, accounting firms are going
to have to acquire an up-front waiver of the privilege from their clients for
purposes of the audit requirement. 4 However, obtaining this up-front
waiver would also seem to waive the tax practitioner-client privilege for
all purposes, effectively making the privilege worthless. 1 ' Also,
practitioners have expressed serious reservation about asking the client "in
the
advance, without knowledge, to waive the privilege
'1 16to protect
accountant from liability to the detriment of the client."
Consequently, the tax practitioner-client privilege and the dual
functions performed by the accountant place the accountant in the tenuous
position of having to fully disclose client information to the SEC, civil
plaintiffs, and thus the entire world, except for the IRS.11 7 Therefore, the
tax practitioner-client privilege is inconsistent with the duties and
obligations of an accountant because the independence and disclosure
responsibilities of an auditor fundamentally118conflict with the advocacy and
confidentiality obligations of an attorney.
B. Promotion of IllegalActivity
The Justice Department recently authored a letter detailing their reasons
for opposing the creation of a tax practitioner-client privilege. 1 9 The
primary concern of the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was that the privilege would prevent or impede the
Government from obtaining information needed for bona fide

112. Id. (quoting Ken C. Jones, KPMG Peat Marwick, Washington, D.C.).
113. See id. (paraphrasing Fred F. Murray, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington,

D.C.).
114. See id. (quoting Lawrence M. Hill, Brown & Wook, New York).
115. Cf.EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 220; United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158, 1160 (11th
Cir. 1987) (holding that when a client waived the privilege while testifying in support of his motion
to withdraw a guilty plea, he could not later assert the privilege to bar his attorney's testimony on
the same subject at trial after the plea was set aside); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15
F.R.D. 461,464 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ("If the client waives the privilege at a first trial, he may not
claim it at a subsequent trial, because after the publication the communication is no longer
confidential and there is no reason for recognizing the privilege.").
116. Stratton, Sliced and Diced, supra note 82.
117. See Raby & Raby, supra note 99.
118. See Shestack, supra note 94; see also Tucker, supra note 95; Calvin H. Johnson, Law
Professor Urges SEC Chairto GetAccountantPrivilege ProposalAmended, 98TAXNOTESTODAY

39-44 (1998) ("The role of secret business adviser is not consistent with the auditing accountant's
paramount duties to the investing public.").
119. See Anthony L. Sutin, Justice LetterRaising Constitutional Concerns in IRS Reform, 98
TAX NOTES TODAY 112-41 (1998).
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investigations." The Justice Department and the FBI were also concerned
that the tax practitioner-client privilege would be asserted in non-tax
contexts in
an effort to prevent waiver of the tax practitioner-client
12
privilege. '
Both the Department of Justice and the FBI view the privilege as 1an
22
obstacle to the investigation and prosecution of fraud matters.
Particularly, the government feared that the privilege would impede the
investigation of civil tax matters which often lead to criminal tax
referrals.123 Moreover, in the past, accountants have notified the IRS of tax
offenses committed by their clients." Under the new privilege, however,
accountants may be silent for fear of liability from disclosing privileged
information."
Furthermore, taxpayers sometimes try to conceal or hide evidence by
placing documents with their attorneys. 2 6 This strategy of hiding behind
the attorney-client privilege rarely succeeds when the IRS seriously
pursues the improperly concealed documents, but that is no reason to
ignore this potential problem. 27 The strategy of concealing documents
under the cloak of the attorney-client privilege tends to be more effective
when the IRS is faced with either time or financial constraints. 12 Even if
the documents are ultimately discoverable, this strategy is costly because
of delays and heightened tax administration costs associated with obtaining
the documents.129
With the creation of the tax practitioner-client privilege, it is reasonably
foreseeable that taxpayers will use this "hide the document" strategy more
often.13 The greater the number of tax practitioners within the scope of the
privilege, the greater the chance that a taxpayer could find a tax
practitioner who would be willing to participate in a conspiracy to
withhold information from the IRS
based on an erroneous assertion of the
31
tax practitioner-client privilege.1

120. Seeid.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Steve R. Johnson, TaxAdvisor-Client Privilege:An Idea Whose Time Should Never
Come, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 35-89 (1998).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. In theory, the IRS could exact punishment for such behavior. See id. n.27. Under
§ 7525(a)(1)(A), only a tax practitioner who is "authorized to practice before the Internal Revenue
Service" could assert the tax practitioner-client privilege. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1)(A). Consequently,
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Therefore, the tax practitioner-client privilege will likely lead to more
taxpayer attempts to conceal information to which the IRS should have
access, it will hamper prevention of the "hide the document" strategy, and
it will thus increase system costs. 32 Furthermore, "[t]his is [also] troubling
because the results of [IRS] audits are only as good as the information on
which they are based.' 33 Consequently, it will be easier for taxpayers to
evade tax laws because the tax practitioner-client privilege will render IRS
audits less effective."M
C. Uncertainty as to When the Tax PractitionerClientPrivilegeIs Waived
Even though the tax practitioner-client privilege is an extension of the
attorney-client privilege," 5 the new tax practitioner-client privilege creates
some unique problems with regard to waiver of the privilege.136 One
problem regarding waiver of the tax practitioner-client privilege arises
because the tax practitioner-client privilege is not applicable to state tax
issues."3 7 If a tax case first went to state court, the IRS could "'back-door
the use of that information"' by obtaining the confidential information after
it became public information during the state tax case. 3 '
Also, the tax practitioner-client privilege is not applicable to
proceedings before agencies other than the IRS and is not applicable in the
public audit context. 139 Therefore, "'if the SEC conducts an investigation,
if a state board of accountancy or the AICPA [American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants] conducts an internal investigation, those
materials would not be privileged and would be discoverable.""'4 Deborah
A. Butler, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel (Field Service), agreed and stated
"[i]f you are practicing in the Tax Court, for privilege waiver purposes,

the Secretary of the Treasury could revoke a tax practitioner's license to assert a privilege by
revoking their authorization to practice before the IRS. See Johnson, supra note 126, at n.27; 31
C.F.R. § 10.50 (1998) (The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to "disbar any practitioner from
practice before the Internal Revenue Service... shown to be... disreputable.").
132. See Johnson, supra note 126.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1).
136. See Stratton, Sliced and Diced, supra note 82.
137. See I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2) (providing that the tax practitioner-client privilege can only be

asserted in "(A) Any noncriminal tax matter before the [IRS]; and (B) any noncriminal tax
proceeding in Federal court."
138. Stratton, Sliced and Diced, supra note 82.
139. See id.; I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2); S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998).
140. Stratton, Sliced and Diced, supranote 82 (quoting Lawrence M. Hill, Brown & Wood,
New York).
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once something is disclosed, it is waived for all purposes."' 141 For
example, a waiver problem common to publicly traded corporate taxpayers
is that if a tax item, such as a loss carryover, is important enough to be part
of tax accrual workpapers, then none of the documentation can be
privileged information because those documents are reachable by the
SEC.142 Indeed, in UnitedStates v. ArthurYoung & Co.,143 the Court relied
partially on the availability of tax accrual workpapers to the SEC and
private litigants in securities fraud suits, when it held
1 4 that those
workpapers were not privileged when sought by the IRS.
Furthermore, the tax practitioner-client privilege could possibly be
waived if privileged information is disseminated too broadly within an
accounting firm.14 For example, the tax practitioner-client privilege could
be waived if an accounting form posts a client's tax information on the
firm's Intranet."4 Accounting firms may find it very difficult to establish
the necessary internal firewalls to separate confidential tax advice from
other advice, when professionals of various disciplines are sharing client
information and sharing an Intranet. 47 Therefore, it seems that the day-today business activities of accountants may lead to inadvertent waiver of the
tax practitioner-client privilege and malpractice lawsuits for accountants.1"
D. What Happens When a Civil Tax MatterBecomes
a CriminalTax Matter?
Section 7525(a) (2)provides that the tax practitioner-client privilege can
only be asserted in noncriminal tax matters before the IRS and before a
Federal court where the IRS is a party.149 However, criminal tax matters
frequently stem from civil tax matters. 5 So, what happens if the tax

141. Id. (quoting Deborah A. Butler, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel (Field Service)).
142. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. United States Internat'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409,
1416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991);

Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sheppard, supranote 23;
see also United States v. M.I.T., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (Ist Cir. 1997) (The IRS sought M.I.T.'s

lawyer's billing records and M.I.T. asserted the attorney-client privilege. However, the court held
that the privilege was waived because the billing records had previously been disclosed to the
Defense Department's contract auditors.).
143. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
144. See id. at 820; Sheppard, supra note 23.
145. See Stratton, Sliced and Diced,supra note 82.
146. See Sheppard, supra note 23.
147. See id.
148. See Dan L. Mendelson et al., The New CPA-Client Confidentiality Privilege, TAX
ADVISOR, Oct. 1998, at 676,682.
149. See S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998); supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
150. See Knight & Knight, supra note 56, at 186, (citing RICHARD M. ROBERTS & RICHARD
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practitioner-client privilege is asserted in a civil tax matter which leads to
a criminal tax matter, and the privileged communications in the civil tax
matter are also sought in the criminal tax matter?151 While this question
currently appears to have no answer, 1 2 it appears that the taxpayer would
lose the benefit of the tax practitioner-client privilege and the IRS could
obtain all communications between taxpayers and their non-attorney tax

practitioners. 153
However, if the tax practitioner-client privilege is destroyed when a
civil tax matter becomes a criminal tax matter, the door is opened to
potential abuse by the IRS.' 54 In the experience of Regina J. Schroder,
Chair of the Executive Committee of the Taxation Section of the State Bar
of California, "a taxpayer's accountant and other non-lawyer advisors are
55
often subpoenaed as witnesses in a criminal Federal tax proceeding."'
Because of this fact, the IRS could attempt to circumvent the tax
practitioner-client privilege by using any strained reasoning to turn civil tax
matters into criminal tax matters in order to obtain discovery of formerly
privileged communications between taxpayers and their non-attorney tax
practitioners.15 6 Consequently, the status of the tax practitioner-client
privilege when a civil tax matter becomes a criminal tax matter will have
to be determined before the tax practitioner-client privilege will
substantively augment a taxpayer's rights.
E. The Limited Effect of the Tax Practitioner-Client
Privilege in Actual Practice
While pristine in theory, the tax practitioner-client privilege may not be
the utopia that accountants and other non-attorney tax practitioners were
hoping for because, like the attorney-client privilege, it will rarely be
asserted by taxpayers in civil tax matters.1 17 Taxpayers rarely assert the
attorney-client privilege in civil tax matters because IRS revenue agents
rarely attempt to learn the content of communications between taxpayers
F. RILEY, JR., A-2, CRIMINALTAX PROCEDURE, 162 T.M. (1987); Sutin, supra note 119; see, e.g.,
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 808-09 (1984) (The IRS sought tax-accrual
workpapers only after a routine civil audit revealed that the taxpayer made questionable payments
from a"special disbursement account," and the IRS initiated a crininal tax investigation.); see also
supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
151. See Sheryl Stratton,ABA Tax Section Meeting: TaxAdvisorPrivilegeQuestions Continue
to PlaguePractitioners,98 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-3 (1998).
152. See id.
153. See Mendelson et al., supra note 148, at 679.
154. See ReginaJ. Schroder, CaliforniaBarTaxSectionComments on IRS RestructuringBill,
98 TAx NOTES TODAY 43-24 (1998).

155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Johnson, supra note 126.
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and their tax attorneys or even their non-attorney tax practitioners. 5 ' There
are at least two reasons why agents infrequently seek these
communications.' 59
First, agents realize that they will conduct many more audits in the
future and so they will likely encounter the same tax practitioners."W Thus,
it is in the agent's best interest to maintain, to the extent possible, friendly
relations with the tax practitioners.' 61 One way to maintain friendly
relations is to avoid interrogating 16 the
tax practitioner regarding tax
2
practitioner-client communications.
Second, agents usually have specific goals, and limited time and
resources within which to achieve those goals. 63 Once the agent has
completed the standard fact gathering procedures, there is pressure for the
agent to "move the case along" because of work-load management
realities."6 Also, agents know that tax practitioner-client communications
are sensitive and learning their content would likely result in a fierce and
drawn-out battle. 161 Consequently, it is usually in the agent's best interest
to avoid picking another fight and to either close the case or issue a 30-day
letter to move the case to appeals."6
The "tax accrual workpapers"' 67 issue is one example of the IRS rarely
taking advantage of its ability, before the IRS Reform Act of 1998, to learn
the content of tax practitioner-client communications.16 In United States
v. Arthur Young & Co.,169 the Supreme Court ruled that §7602170 permitted

158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. Seeki.
165. See id.
166. See id. "In unagreed field examined income, estate, and gift cases in which a deficiency
has been determined, a preliminary (30-day) letter will be issued to the taxpayer." I.R.S. MANUAL
HANDBOOK, HB 48(13)2, § 441(1), availablein LEXIS, TAXRIA Library, Manual File. '"he 30day letter notifies the taxpayer that he/she has 30 days in which to agree or submit a protest." Id.
167. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
168. See Johnson, supra note 126.
169. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
170. I.R.C. § 7602 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Authority to summon, etc.-For the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made,
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the
liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
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the IRS to obtain, by summons, relevant tax-accrual workpapers prepared
by the taxpayer's independent auditors. 7 Furthermore,
tax accrual
172
workpapers are useful to the IRS as an "audit road map."
Yet, the Internal Revenue Manual instructs agents to only seek tax
accrual workpapers in "unusual circumstances ' 173 and then only after
obtaining "prior written approval of the Chief, Examination Division."' 74
Therefore, because the IRS infrequently attempts to learn the contents of

tax practitioner-client communications which are now protected by the tax
practitioner-client privilege, it is unlikely that the tax practitioner-client
7
privilege will have any significant effect when applied in actual practice. 1
VI. CONCLUSION

For decades accountants have unsuccessfully urged courts and lobbied
Congress to create atax practitioner-client privilege so that they could gain
market share from lawyers in the tax work market. 7 6 Did accountants
finally get the privilege they always wanted? In reality, it seems that what

accountants and other non-attorney tax practitioners got was a privilege
without any teeth that may serve little or no purpose. 177 Moreover, because

relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having
possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to
perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper,
to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material
to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.

171. See Johnson, supra note 126 (citingArthurYoung & Co., 465 U.S. at 805).
172. Id.
173. Id. n. 11(quoting IRM 4024.4(1)-(3)); see, eg., Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 808-09
(The IRS sought tax-accrual workpapers only after a routine civil audit revealed that the taxpayer
made questionable payments from a"special disbursement account" and the IRS initiated a criminal
tax investigation.).
174. Johnson, supranote 126, atn.12 (quotingIRM 4024.4(5)). The Chief Counsel Directives
Manual requires IRS attorneys to follow special coordination procedures for summonses and
discovery involving tax-accrual workpapers. See id. (citingC.C.D.M. (34)613(2)(i); (34)(12)36(2);
(35)5(12)1(8); (35)5(12)2.2(6)).
175. See Johnson, supra note 126.
176. See Paul R. Rice, The Tax Practitioner Privilege: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing, 98 TAX
NoTEs TODAY 148-66 (1998).
177. See supra Part V.
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of the laudable benefits of the tax practitioner-client privilege,"' nonattorney tax practitioners and taxpayers will surely begin asserting the
privilege in practice.7 9 However, the resulting judicial quagmire created
by the privilege's problems will swallow its benefits.

178. See supra Part IV.
179. See Rice, supra note 176.
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